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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-PREVENTION OF PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION. When
plaintiffs, a Negro couple, sought to purchase a new home in a private-
ly owned and financed housing subdivision, they were candidly re-
buffed by reason of their race. An action was thereafter brought in
the Federal District Court' against the defendant land development-
realty company, in which it was alleged that the refusal to sell a house
and lot to them solely because of their race violated, inter alia, plain-
tiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, 2000a,' and the Thirteenth'
and Fourteenth4 Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The District Court rejected the allegations on the grounds that no
state involvement was shown, and the Circuit Court affirmed,5 albeit
stating that "it would not be surprising if the Supreme Court one day
were to hold that a court errs when it dismisses a complaint of this
kind." "
The necessity of "state action" as a prerequisite to invoking the pro-
scription of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and
its legislative implementation derives initially from Supreme Court de-
cisions of the period 1876-1883 invalidating much of the Reconstruc-
1. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 255 F.Supp. 115 (1966).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1982: All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 makes liable every person "who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws .... "
42 U.S.C. § 2000a provides in part that all persons shall be free from racial discrimina-
tion where such "is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof."
3. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
4. 1.... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article.




tion's civil rights acts.7 In U.S. v. Cruiksbank and subsequent cases8
the view evolved that the Equal Protection Clause, which the acts were
intended to enforce, added nothing to the rights which one citizen
has against another under the Constitution. The Amendment itself is
expressly self-restricting in its first section,0 and the Court saw in § 5
no expansion of congressional power so as to encompass the realm of
private racial discrimination, although there is much to support an argu-
ment that it was the intent of Congress that it should do so.10
While state action remains nominally as the sole poison to which the
federal antidote is applicable, case law has enlarged the term's mean-
ing to the point where the action need be neither exclusive nor direct;
and it may be amply noxious "even though the participation of the
state was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative
forces leading to the constitutional violation." "' Under the broadened
definition, state action has been found by the Supreme Court where
the courts are used to enforce racial covenants on real property; 12 where
a government lessee practices discrimination in the operation of the
leased premises; 13 and where a voter-approved amendment to a state
constitution barred the state government from legislating in the field of
private discrimination in housing.' 4 It has also been found where a
government agency, acting in the capacity of a trustee of real property,
maintains a policy of segregation pursuant to the terms of a will,'3 and
in Evans v. Newton"' a private board of trustees was enjoined from
7. Now found at 18 U.S.C. § 241, 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
8. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Also U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9. Supra note 4.
10. See Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YAE L.J. 1353 (1964).
11. U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966).
12. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Bar-
rows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14. Reitman v. Mulkey, 87 S.Ct. 1627 (1967) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, supra note 13). "This court has never attempted the 'impossible task' of
formulating an infallible test for determining whether the state 'in any of its manifes-
tations' has become significantly involved in private discriminations. 'Only by sifting
the facts and weighing the circumstances' on a case-to-case basis can a 'nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.'" Id. at
1632.
15. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
16. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The concept here is one of "public characteristics." See
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), a case involving freedom of speech in a com-
pany-owned town, where it was held that regardless of ownership of the town, the
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racially discriminating in the operation of a private park created by
a will, where the park formerly had been administered on a non-segre-
gated basis by government trustees.
Furthermore, the question of the extent of power afforded Congress
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is open to speculation in light
of the Court's apparent willingness in U.S. v. Guest'7 to overrule that
part of the Civil Rights Cases 8 which limited enforcement of the
Amendment to a prohibition of state action denying a person equal
protection of the law. Finding the requisite state involvement by re-
sorting to the fact that private conspirators had falsely alleged criminal
acts by Negroes, thus bringing about their arrest by the police and a
consequent denial of their constitutionally protected right to interstate
travel, three Justices 18 nevertheless felt compelled to state that it is
"both appropriate and necessary under the circumstances here to say that
there now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers
the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without
state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." '20
Three other Justices21 were inclined to extend § 5 to all rights secured by
the Constitution,2 2 at least insofar as their denial was effectuated con-
spiratorially.
The present case2 will carry to the court a tripartite argument urg-
ing, at the least, Federal interdiction of discrimination in the sale of homes
in a subdivision, with the ultimate objective of eliminating altogether
the power to differentiate racially in the sale of real property as a right
public has an identical interest in the functioning of the community so as to preserve
the freedom to communicate.
In Evans, Mr. Justice Douglas phrased it as follows: "The park, however, is in a
different posture. For years it was an integral part of the City of Macon's activities.
... we cannot take judicial notice that the mere substitution of trustees instantly trans-
ferred this park from the public to the private sector." Id. at 301.
17. U.S. v. Guest, supra note 11 at 754. "Since we therefore deal here only with the
bare terms of the Equal Protection Clause itself, nothing said in this opinion goes to
the question of what kinds of other and broader legislation Congress might constitu-
tionally enact under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to implement that Clause or
any other provision of the Amendment."
18. Supra note 8.
19. Mr. Justice Clark, with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Fortas joined.
20. U.S. v. Guest, supra note 11 at 762.
21. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas join.
22. U.S. v. Guest, supra note 11 at 777.
23. Supra note 5.
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incident to ownership.24 The contention is, first, that the 1866 prede-
cessor of the present § 19 82 5 was enacted to implement the Thirteenth
Amendment, and is arguably not bound, therefore, by a state action
requirement. But if reenactment and revision of the statute subsequent
to passage of the Fourteenth brought it within the scope of that amend-
ment, it still falls within the broad authority of § 5 as it was character-
ized in Guest. Lastly, the plaintiffs assert the presence of state action
by reason of the State's licensing of defendants as real estate brokers
and land developers; its "protection" of their operation by state law
(e.g., zoning and bank lending laws); and its approval of the project
through agencies such as the Highway Department, Building Commis-
sion, and the district which will furnish sewer services to the sub-
division. It is also stressed that the defendants are acting comparably
to a municipality, and should be subject to the same proscription.26
The district and circuit courts dismissed the action, delimited, in
their view, by the dictates of case law. That the Supreme Court will
find itself similarly disposed, however, is seriously questionable. Should
it not, the present case will mark the commencement of a critical new
phase in the Federal-State balance of power over private acts, and the
Court will have done judicially what the Eighty-ninth Congress was un-
able to accomplish legislatively.
Richard A. Repp
Constitutional Law--FREE SPEECH-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF QUALIFI-
TIONS OF LEGISLATORS. Julian Bond, a Negro and a duly elected member
of the House of Representatives of Georgia, was deprived of his seat
24. Reitman v. Mulkey, supra note 14. One reading of this case is that the power to
alienate real property freely is not a right, since it is its "authorization" which is here
being condemned. While the amendment to the California constitution prohibited only
infringement on the right to sell to whom one pleases, the Court concluded that it
"was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing
market. The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State.' Id.
at 1634 (Italics added.).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
26. See Reitman v. Mulkey, supra note 14 at 1635 (concurring opinion).
"Zoning is a state and municipal function .... When the State leaves that function
to private agencies or institutions who are licensees and who practice racial discrimina-
tion and zone our cities into white and black belts or black and white ghettoes, it
suffers a governmental function to be performed under private auspices in a way the
state itself may not act .... Leaving the zoning function to groups who practice racial
discrimination and are licensed by the States constitutes state action in the narrowest
sense in which Shelley v. Kxaemer can be construed?'
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